The heatwave in late June 2026 exposed a fundamental weakness in German energy policy: electricity imports only work as long as neighboring countries actually have surpluses. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark required additional power at times, while heat, low wind speeds, and declining solar output in the evening exacerbated the situation. France’s electricity supply was not actually a critical issue—despite how it was portrayed in some media reports due to several nuclear power plants running at reduced capacity because of the temperatures. What was problematic was the German expectation that France could reliably supply additional electricity to all its neighbors, even during a Europe-wide heatwave.
Electricity imports only work when there are genuine surpluses
The political argument sounds convenient: if Germany generates too little electricity, it can simply be sourced from abroad. Yet this assumption overlooks a crucial point. A neighboring country can only supply what remains after meeting its own needs. Electricity trading is no guarantee of capacity; it is a substitute for neither domestic power plants nor the reliable power supply required during critical hours.
Image: AI-generated
It was precisely this limit that became apparent during the heatwave. Short-term electricity prices surged in several European markets. Buyers in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark were simultaneously seeking additional supplies. Such prices do not occur when there is a surplus; they indicate that multiple countries were trying to access the same scarce capacity at the same time.
France remained stable but was not Europe’s emergency power source
France’s role was particularly revealing. The country did not face a supply crisis. The French grid operator, RTE, declared the supply secure despite reduced output from individual EDF reactors. These cutbacks were due to high river temperatures and environmental regulations regarding cooling water; they were not a sign of an unstable French power system.
This is precisely why the episode is so significant for Germany. France was able to meet its own needs, but it could not supply the volume of surplus electricity that Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark additionally required. This demonstrated not France’s weakness, but Germany’s dependence on surpluses from abroad. Those who dismantle their own firm capacity cannot simply assume that a neighbor will be able to step in during every crisis.
Annual balances mask the critical hour
Official trade data also offer only a false sense of security. In 2025, Germany imported more electricity than it exported. Although the balance briefly shifted in the first quarter of 2026, such figures reveal little about security of supply. The decisive factor is not the annual or quarterly tally; what matters is whether sufficient capacity is available on a low-wind evening with high demand.
This is exactly where the distinction between market dynamics and security lies. Under normal operating conditions, European electricity trading lowers costs and balances out regional disparities. However, this mechanism is of limited help during widespread weather events. When a high-pressure system brings little wind, when heat increases cooling demands, and when solar power drops off in the evening, multiple countries face the same problem.
Germany is already factoring in the shortfall
It has long been known that domestic power plants are no longer sufficient during critical periods. Yet, the gap is not being consistently closed by additional domestic reserve capacity. Instead, Germany increasingly relies on electricity imports and foreign reserve power plants to cover the shortfall in generation capacity. Consequently, electricity from neighboring countries is no longer treated merely as a market supplement, but as a substitute for domestic dispatchable capacity.
A reserve requirement of more than seven gigawatts has been confirmed for the winter of 2026/2027. A significant portion of this is intended to come from foreign reserve power plants. This is a sensitive issue in terms of energy policy: Germany is aware that it needs additional capacity during periods of strain, yet it continues to operate on the assumption that neighboring countries will provide it.
Crises often affect multiple countries simultaneously.
It is precisely this assumption—that such support is a given—that represents a dangerous fallacy. The problem is not limited to heatwaves; cold snaps, severe storms, floods, widespread wildfires, technical failures, or other natural disasters can also strain power supplies across multiple countries at the same time. In such scenarios, demand rises not only in Germany but in neighboring countries as well.
A neighbor does not supply electricity simply because Germany needs it; they only supply it if they have a surplus themselves. During a widespread crisis, the European interconnected grid cannot replace missing power plants; it merely distributes the scarcity.
Germany increasingly treats foreign surpluses as if they were its own reserve power plants. However, electricity that a neighbor has available only during normal times cannot serve as a guarantee of supply for Germany during a crisis.
Author: Blackout News
Sources: PV-Magazine (23.06.26) – Le Monde (24.06.26) – Reuters (25.06.26) – Bundesnetzagentur (05.01.26) – EuroNews (25.06.26)