A commentary by our author Klaus Bastian
On July 25, 2026, around 10 p.m., Berlin was the scene of an attack linked to the Christopher Street Day (CSD) festivities. Abdul B. allegedly drove a rented van into a crowd in the Tiergarten park. He then reportedly attacked passersby with a bladed weapon. One woman died, and 29 other people sustained injuries, some of them severe. The 21-year-old had a history of violent offenses and had sought to join the so-called Islamic State. Nevertheless, a judge at the Tiergarten District Court released him on probation following a juvenile sentence of one year and ten months. The Public Prosecutor’s Office had sought a harsher sentence and continued detention. On July 26, Abdul B. died during a police operation after—according to authorities—he attacked special forces with a bladed weapon.
Merz turns the CSD attack into a moralizing lecture
At the memorial service, Chancellor Friedrich Merz declared: “Intolerance, exclusion, discrimination, stupid remarks, and bad jokes are already part of such violence.” This statement is an affront to the victims, the injured, and the bereaved. It is hard to imagine anything more embarrassing. Just hours earlier, a suspected Islamist had killed one person and injured 29 others. Yet Merz placed tasteless remarks on the same conceptual level as a deadly attack. Clearly, the Chancellor lacked any sense of the situation—both politically and personally.
Image: Shutterstock
It was no bad joke that led to the lifting of the arrest warrant for Abdul B. No foolish turn of phrase secured his freedom. State institutions made this decision despite his history of violence and advanced radicalization. The court even explicitly deemed further criminal acts a possibility. Nevertheless, it opted for educational measures, a probationary period, and a planned deradicalization program. The CSD attack therefore reflects not an abstract social climate, but a concrete error in judgment by the state. Merz should have addressed this, rather than rhetorically spreading responsibility across society as a whole.
The same political formulas follow every attack
After the Breitscheidplatz attack, an investigative committee documented misjudgments, failures, and fragmented jurisdictions. Following the attack in Mannheim, Olaf Scholz promised the full force of the law, and after Solingen, a security package including new knife bans was introduced. After Magdeburg, the government once again promised a thorough investigation and a tough response. After Aschaffenburg, Merz declared that the limit had been reached and presented five demands. Yet, following the CSD attack, the same ritual begins anew. Politicians express concern, promise a review of events, and announce that measures are being examined. However, personal accountability is consistently absent.
The knife bans introduced after Solingen illustrate this political performative action particularly clearly. Such rules can facilitate checks and remove individual weapons from circulation. Against a determined terrorist, however, they remain virtually meaningless. Anyone planning murder will ignore an additional ban at a train station or a public festival. It is not the knives that are dangerous, but the people who use them to stab others. Knife bans therefore address only the tool, not the perpetrator or the already known danger. In the Berlin case, the state had already arrested, charged, and convicted the man who would later become the attacker. Yet the justice system released him.
Judges make the decisions, but the public bears the consequences
Judges rightly enjoy constitutionally protected independence. Consequently, politicians must neither dictate rulings nor punish judges for unpopular decisions. While legal appeals can correct decisions, this often takes months. Furthermore, the criminal offense of perverting the course of justice requires far more than merely a questionable risk assessment or a lenient sentence. This creates a gap in accountability: judges decide on the liberty of a potential threat, while uninvolved citizens bear the cost when that risk assessment proves wrong. Institutionally, such decisions rarely entail personal consequences for the judges involved.
Policymakers could narrow this gap without abolishing judicial independence. They could legally rule out early release for serious terrorism offenses where a favorable risk assessment is lacking. Additionally, they could mandate immediate review by a higher court whenever a release is ordered against the prosecution’s recommendation. For convicted individuals deemed a threat, measures such as binding expert assessments, case conferences, and close monitoring could be implemented. Yet, doing so would require politicians to deliver more than just expressions of dismay and new “no-go zones.” Bad jokes are not the core security issue. The real problem is a state that identifies known threats, releases them, and—after lives have been lost—repeats the same empty platitudes.
Author: Klaus Bastian – Blackout News
Sources: Legal Tribune Online (27.07.26) – Tagesschau (27.07.26) – ZDFHeute (27.07.26) – Die Bundesregierung (26.07.26) – Polizei Berlin (26.07.26)