The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) warn that wind turbines located near radar systems can interfere with military radar installations. They cite reflections, false echoes, and shadowing, as these can degrade the quality of the air situation picture. The Ministry of Defense therefore demanded strict building limits around air defense radars. However, this safety measure was not implemented in the federal government’s legislative reform. On the contrary, with this reform, the federal government is promoting the expansion of wind power in the vicinity of military radar systems, thereby accepting the resulting security gaps. (bmvg: 15.01.26)
German Bundestag Resolution of January 15, 2026 – The Precautionary Measure Was Removed
On January 15, 2026, the German Bundestag passed the Law on Accelerated Planning and Procurement for the German Armed Forces (BwPBBG). This legislative reform also included amendments to the Air Traffic Act. Section 18a of the Air Traffic Act is crucial because it regulates the permissibility of projects in the vicinity of certain facilities. This gave the conflict of objectives between wind power and military radar systems a concrete legal basis; however, the political decision favored the expansion of wind power.
In the draft and debated versions of the legislation from 2025, a significantly stricter logic was on the table: a precautionary threshold. Wind turbines could be prohibited in the vicinity of air defense radars even if the radar function “could be disrupted.” This wording would have been effective early on because it limited risks before construction. However, policymakers pushed back precisely this approach in the legislative reform, instead introducing a much higher hurdle.
“Significant impairment” instead of “could be disrupted” – expansion takes priority
Under the adopted framework, interventions will only be permitted if a “significant impairment” of the radar systems is proven, and this proof must be provided by an expert assessment. With this, the legislature reverses the logic, as security is no longer preventive but only achieved after solid evidence has been presented. For the German Armed Forces, this means they must demonstrate a high threshold, while projects remain predictable in case of doubt. In practice, this strengthens investment and planning security for wind farms, even though the armed forces are specifically warning against the creation of new areas of interference.
The German Armed Forces criticize this approach, arguing that radar effects cannot be neatly “tested away” on paper because many interferences only become apparent through the interplay of location, installation height, and weather conditions. Furthermore, they cannot arbitrarily disclose technical parameters, as capabilities and limit values are often classified. This significantly complicates the required verification and postpones the debate to later stages of the approval process. Thus, the expansion of radar systems gains time, while radar protection must provide stronger arguments in the proceedings.
Area-based logic shapes policy – radar performance is non-negotiable
In the political deliberations, arguments regarding area and expansion dominated, as associations warned of large-scale obstruction effects caused by protected areas for radar systems. The debate centered on the possibility that test zones around air defense radars could encompass very large areas, with some mentioning up to a third of the country’s land area. This context created pressure and favored the decision for more restrictive intervention capabilities. In doing so, policymakers effectively prioritized expansion over airspace surveillance, even though they consider the Bundeswehr’s radar systems to be a core component of national defense.
For the armed forces, what matters is not the percentage, but the operational capability in the affected sector. A loss of quality remains operationally relevant because it complicates identification and early detection. Furthermore, radar systems cannot be arbitrarily relocated, as location logic, topography, and system integration impose limitations. Raising the intervention threshold therefore implies a gradual shift in airspace surveillance capabilities, and this is precisely what the defense community criticizes.
In short, the priorities are clear: the Bundestag replaced the precautionary threshold of “may be disrupted” with the significantly higher proof hurdle of “considerable impairment.” This makes it easier to expand wind power, while radar protection only kicks in under strict conditions. This approach strengthens planning objectives, but it weakens the air defense security reserve. Anyone who makes this decision accepts limitations on radar systems to prevent the expansion from stalling. (KOB)